Evolution of strategies for the collective-risk social dilemma relating to climate change
Portland State University - Portland, OR 97201, USA
Accepted: 5 July 2011
This paper describes an N-person social dilemma game created to study how climate change agreement strategies develop. The players in this game are trying to collect a target amount for a climate aid fund. Players (countries) fall into three categories: cooperators who contribute their fair share, altruists who contribute more than their fair share and defectors who contribute nothing. In all cases we would evolve a set of player strategies that collected the target sum (− 0%/+0.5%). Our results indicate defection is a preferred strategy, but trigger strategies can markedly improve contributions. Our game is designed to see what motivates countries to live up to their agreements to contribute to climate change aid funds.
PACS: 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 87.23.Ge – Dynamics of social systems
© EPLA, 2011