Climate collective risk dilemma with feedback of real-time temperatures
1 Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University - Beijing 100871, China
2 Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
Received: 3 June 2014
Accepted: 1 September 2014
Controlling global warming through collective cooperation is a non-optional threshold public goods game. Previous models assume that the disaster is a sudden event and it happens with a given probability. It is shown that high risk can pave the way for reaching the cooperative target. These models, however, neglect the temperature dynamics, which is influenced by the collective behaviours. Here, we establish a temperature dynamics, and introduce the feedback between human strategy updating and the temperature change: high temperature will discount individuals' payoffs; while sufficient public goods may decrease the ever-rising temperature. We investigate how the temperature is affected by human behaviour and vice versa. It is found that, on the one hand, the temperature can be stabilized to a relatively safe level in the long run. On the other hand, the cooperation can be promoted and be maintained at a higher level, compared with public goods game models with no such feedback.
PACS: 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 87.23.Kg – Dynamics of evolution / 87.23.Ge – Dynamics of social systems
© EPLA, 2014