Cooperation induced by wise incentive allocation in spontaneous institution
1 Center for Intelligent and Networked Systems, Department of Automation and TNList, Tsinghua University Beijing, 100084, China
2 Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University - Beijing 100871, China
Received: 12 June 2016
Accepted: 25 August 2016
Institutional incentives such as punishment and rewarding have recently received wide attention in resolving issues of public goods provision that requires collective cooperation. In this letter, we are interested in exploring the effect on cooperation of a spontaneous institution, which rewards its participants exclusively and also takes the social responsibility of punishing interior and exterior free-riders. Drawing support from evolutionary game theory, our results indicate that the splitting ratio of such institution funds plays a decisive role in determining the evolutionary outcome. Rewarding is essential in sustaining the institution, while a certain intensity of punishment ensures a high overall cooperation level. Our results may provide more insights into understanding the roles institutional incentives play in promoting social cooperation.
PACS: 87.23.Kg – Dynamics of evolution / 87.23.Ge – Dynamics of social systems / 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory
© EPLA, 2016