Volume 93, Number 4, February 2011
|Number of page(s)||6|
|Section||Interdisciplinary Physics and Related Areas of Science and Technology|
|Published online||24 February 2011|
Coevolution of cooperation and network structure under natural selection
Department of Physics and Institute of Theoretical Physics and Astrophysics, Xiamen University Xiamen 361005, PRC
Accepted: 27 January 2011
A coevolution model by coupling mortality and fertility selection is introduced to investigate the evolution of cooperation and network structure in the prisoner's dilemma game. The cooperation level goes through a continuous phase transition vs. defection temptation b for low mortality selection intensity β and through a discontinuous one for infinite β. The cooperation level is enhanced most at β≈1 for any b. The local and global properties of the network structure, such as cluster and cooperating k-core, are investigated for the understanding of cooperation evolution. Cooperation is promoted by forming a tight cooperating k-core at moderate β, but too large β will destroy the cooperating k-core rapidly resulting in a rapid drop of the cooperation level. Importantly, the infinite β changes the normalized sucker's payoff S from 0 to 1−b and its dynamics of the cooperation level undergoes a very slow power-law decay, which leads the evolution into the regime of neutral evolution.
PACS: 87.23.Kg – Dynamics of evolution / 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 89.75.Fb – Structures and organization in complex systems
© EPLA, 2011
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