Volume 98, Number 4, May 2012
|Number of page(s)||5|
|Published online||25 May 2012|
Does copy-resistance enhance cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma?
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University - Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
Accepted: 19 April 2012
We propose a novel idea for the so-called pairwise-Fermi process by considering copy-resistance when an agent copies a neighbor's strategy, which implies that the focal agent with relatively affluent payoff vis-à-vis social average might be negative to copy her neighbor's strategy even if her payoff is less than the neighbor's payoff. Simulation results reveal that this idea with a revised strategy adaptation process significantly enhances cooperation for prisoner's dilemma games played on time-constant networks.
PACS: 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 89.65.-s – Social and economic systems / 87.23.Kg – Dynamics of evolution
© EPLA, 2012
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