Volume 99, Number 1, July 2012
|Number of page(s)||6|
|Published online||11 July 2012|
Evolutionary games on scale-free networks with tunable degree distribution
1 Department of Physics, Fuzhou University - Fuzhou 350108, China
2 Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University - Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China
3 School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University - Beijing 100083, China
Received: 23 March 2012
Accepted: 15 June 2012
We study evolutionary games on scale-free networks with tunable degree distribution. The heterogeneity of networks is controlled by the exponent of power-law degree distribution. It is found that there exists an optimal value of the exponent, for which the level of cooperation becomes highest. This phenomenon indicates that, although degree heterogeneity plays an important role in maintaining cooperation, too strong heterogeneity may counterintuitively encourage defection. We observe that, for strong heterogeneity, large-degree nodes are no longer certainly occupied by cooperators. Our results yield insights into the effect of degree heterogeneity on cooperation.
PACS: 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 89.75.Hc – Networks and genealogical trees
© EPLA, 2012
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