Volume 116, Number 5, December 2016
|Number of page(s)||7|
|Section||Interdisciplinary Physics and Related Areas of Science and Technology|
|Published online||20 January 2017|
Fixation of strategies driven by switching probabilities in evolutionary games
1 Department of Automation, College of Computer and Control Engineering, Nankai University Tianjin 300071, PRC
2 Tianjin Key Laboratory of Intelligent Robotics, College of Computer and Control Engineering, Nankai University Tianjin 300071, PRC
Received: 21 September 2016
Accepted: 2 January 2017
We study the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in finite populations which are homogeneous and well mixed by means of the pairwise comparison process, the core of which is the proposed switching probability. Previous studies about this subject are usually based on the known payoff comparison of the related players, which is an ideal assumption. In real social systems, acquiring the accurate payoffs of partners at each round of interaction may be not easy. So we bypass the need of explicit knowledge of payoffs, and encode the payoffs into the willingness of any individual shift from her current strategy to the competing one, and the switching probabilities are wholly independent of payoffs. Along this way, the strategy updating can be performed when game models are fixed and payoffs are unclear, expected to extend ideal assumptions to be more realistic one. We explore the impact of the switching probability on the fixation probability and derive a simple formula which determines the fixation probability. Moreover we find that cooperation dominates defection if the probability of cooperation replacing defection is always larger than the probability of defection replacing cooperation in finite populations. Last, we investigate the influences of model parameters on the fixation of strategies in the framework of three concrete game models: prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift game and stag-hunt game, which effectively portray the characteristics of cooperative dilemmas in real social systems.
PACS: 87.23.Kg – Dynamics of evolution / 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 87.10.-e – General theory and mathematical aspects
© EPLA, 2016
Current usage metrics show cumulative count of Article Views (full-text article views including HTML views, PDF and ePub downloads, according to the available data) and Abstracts Views on Vision4Press platform.
Data correspond to usage on the plateform after 2015. The current usage metrics is available 48-96 hours after online publication and is updated daily on week days.
Initial download of the metrics may take a while.