Volume 136, Number 5, December 2021
|Number of page(s)||7|
|Section||Interdisciplinary Physics and Related Areas of Science and Technology|
|Published online||15 March 2022|
Evolution of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game under the coupling of aspiration and imitation rules
1 School of Information Science and Technology, Jinan University - Guangzhou 510632, China
2 School of Systems Science and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University - Guangzhou 510006, China
Received: 12 October 2021
Accepted: 8 February 2022
Considering the important roles played by aspiration and imitation rules, we explore how cooperation evolves in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In detail, the strategy updating rule couples the inner aspiration payoff and the external neighborâs payoff through the parameter α. Intriguingly, we find that there exists an optimal value of α leading to the highest density of cooperators for each aspiration level A. By analyzing the dynamical strategy changes of the system, we find that an optimal α helps individuals form cooperator clusters and curbs the further spread of high-payoff defectors, and thus improves the density of cooperators. Moreover, when , the optimal value of α, which leads to the highest density of cooperators, decreases with A, the optimal range of α gradually expands and the highest cooperation level is on the rise.
© 2022 EPLA
Current usage metrics show cumulative count of Article Views (full-text article views including HTML views, PDF and ePub downloads, according to the available data) and Abstracts Views on Vision4Press platform.
Data correspond to usage on the plateform after 2015. The current usage metrics is available 48-96 hours after online publication and is updated daily on week days.
Initial download of the metrics may take a while.