| Issue |
EPL
Volume 142, Number 5, June 2023
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Article Number | 51003 | |
| Number of page(s) | 6 | |
| Section | Statistical physics and networks | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/acd4e6 | |
| Published online | 05 June 2023 | |
The effect of historical payoffs on individual strategy updates in the Prisoner's Dilemma
1 School of Science, Tianjin University of Technology - Tianjin 300384, China
2 Department of Physics, Nankai University - Tianjin 300071, China
(a) E-mail: xuzhaojin1234@126.com (corresponding author)
(b) E-mail: Zhanglz@nankai.edu.cn (corresponding author)
Received: 19 November 2022
Accepted: 12 May 2023
Understanding the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals remains a big challenge. In this paper, we introduce a new update rule in which individuals make decision according to their historical performance in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on a square lattice. Comparing our results with the Prisoner's Dilemma experiment, such an update rule can explain the experiment well, suggesting that this update rule may be useful for understanding the behavior of individuals in the experiment. Importantly, we can use this rule to explain the moody conditional cooperation.
© 2023 EPLA
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