Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma gamesA. Szolnoki and G. Szabó
Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science - P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
received 16 November 2006; accepted in final form 8 December 2006; published February 2007
published online 24 January 2007
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from randomly chosen neighbors is controlled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor w characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations at the beginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of w and for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant increase of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.
02.50.Le - Decision theory and game theory.
07.05.Tp - Computer modeling and simulation.
87.23.-n - Ecology and evolution.
© Europhysics Letters Association 2007