Issue
EPL
Volume 87, Number 1, July 2009
Article Number 18007
Number of page(s) 5
Section Interdisciplinary Physics and Related Areas of Science and Technology
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/87/18007
Published online 23 July 2009
EPL, 87 (2009) 18007
DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/87/18007

Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games

G. Szabó, A. Szolnoki and J. Vukov

Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science - P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary, EU

szabo@mfa.kfki.hu

received 17 February 2009; accepted in final form 19 June 2009; published July 2009
published online 23 July 2009

Abstract
We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system towards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains alive even in the coexistence of cooperative and defective behaviors. The final rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of cooperation and affected by the topology of the connectivity structure.

PACS
89.65.-s - Social and economic systems.
87.23.Cc - Population dynamics and ecological pattern formation.
02.50.Le - Decision theory and game theory.

© EPLA 2009