Resolving social dilemmas on evolving random networksAttila Szolnoki1 and Matjaž Perc2
1 Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science - P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary, EU
2 Department of Physics, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia, EU
received 23 February 2009; accepted in final form 20 April 2009; published May 2009
published online 21 May 2009
We show that strategy-independent adaptations of random interaction networks can induce powerful mechanisms, ranging from the Red Queen to group selection, which promote cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas. These two mechanisms emerge spontaneously as dynamical processes due to deletions and additions of links, which are performed whenever players adopt new strategies and after a certain number of game iterations, respectively. The potency of cooperation promotion, as well as the mechanism responsible for it, can thereby be tuned via a single parameter determining the frequency of link additions. We thus demonstrate that coevolving random networks may evoke an appropriate mechanism for each social dilemma, such that cooperation prevails even in highly unfavorable conditions.
02.50.Le - Decision theory and game theory.
87.23.Ge - Dynamics of social systems.
89.75.Fb - Structures and organization in complex systems.
© EPLA 2009