Volume 87, Number 4, August 2009
|Number of page(s)||5|
|Section||Interdisciplinary Physics and Related Areas of Science and Technology|
|Published online||07 September 2009|
Imperfect imitation can enhance cooperation
GISC/Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Madrid, Spain, EU
2 Instituto de Biocomputación y Física de Sistemas Complejos (BIFI), Universidad de Zaragoza - Zaragoza, Spain, EU
3 Instituto de Ciencias Matemáticas CSIC-UAM-UC3M-UCM - Madrid, Spain, EU
Corresponding author: email@example.com
Accepted: 6 August 2009
The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between both regimes, we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional imitation with another imitative rule. We find that, surprisingly, in many social dilemmas this rule yields higher cooperative levels than any of the two original ones. This nontrivial effect occurs because the basic rules induce a separation of timescales in the microscopic processes at cluster interfaces. The result is robust in the space of symmetric games, on regular lattices and on scale-free networks.
PACS: 89.65.-s – Social and economic systems / 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 87.23.Kg – Dynamics of evolution
© EPLA, 2009
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