Volume 110, Number 6, June 2015
|Number of page(s)||6|
|Published online||09 July 2015|
Evolution of cooperation on complex networks with synergistic and discounted group interactions
1 Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University - Beijing 100871, China
2 Center for Complex Network Research and Department of Physics, Northeastern University Boston, MA 02115, USA
(a) firstname.lastname@example.org (corresponding author)
Received: 8 May 2015
Accepted: 18 June 2015
In the real world individuals often engage in group interactions and their payoffs are determined by many factors, including the typical nonlinear interactions, i.e., synergy and discounting. Previous literatures assume that individual payoffs are either synergistically enhanced or discounted with the additional cooperators. Such settings ignore the interplay of these two factors, which is in sharp contrast with the fact that they ubiquitously coexist. Here we investigate how the coexistence and periodical switching of synergistic and discounted group interactions affect the evolution of cooperation on various complex networks. We show that scale-free networks facilitate the emergence of cooperation in terms of fixation probability for group interactions. With nonlinear interactions the heterogeneity of the degree acts as a double-edged sword: below the neutral drift it is the best for cooperation while above the neutral drift it instead provides the least opportunity for cooperators to be fixed. The advantages of the heterogeneity fade as interactive attributes switch between synergy and discounting, which suggests that the heterogeneity of population structures cannot favor cooperators in group interactions even with simple nonlinear interactions. Nonetheless, scale-free networks always guarantee cooperators the fastest rate of fixation. Our work implies that even very simple nonlinear group interactions could greatly shape the fixation probability and fixation time of cooperators in structured populations indicated by complex networks.
PACS: 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 87.23.Kg – Dynamics of evolution / 87.23.Ge – Dynamics of social systems
© EPLA, 2015
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