Volume 122, Number 5, June 2018
|Number of page(s)||6|
|Published online||16 July 2018|
The emergence of cooperation-extortion alliance on scale-free networks with normalized payoff
1 CompleX Lab, School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China - Chengdu 611731, China
2 Big Data Research Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China - Chengdu 611731, China
3 Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University - Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China
Received: 14 May 2018
Accepted: 25 June 2018
Based on the Prisoner's Dilemma game, this paper investigates the evolution of extortion behavior with cooperation and defection strategies on the Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free network under the normalized payoff framework. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we show that the cooperation-extortion alliance emerges, and extortioners can act as catalysts to help cooperators survive on the scale-free network. Moreover, we find the non-trivial influence of the extortion factor on the evolution of cooperation, which implies that there exists an optimal value of the extortion factor with which the cooperation-extortion alliance is mostly favored and may defeat defectors on the networks with the normalized payoff framework.
PACS: 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 89.75.Fb – Structures and organization in complex systems / 89.65.-s – Social and economic systems
© EPLA, 2018
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