Volume 140, Number 6, December 2022
|Number of page(s)||7|
|Section||Statistical physics and networks|
|Published online||28 December 2022|
Punishment and reputation based partners-switching promotes cooperation in social networks
School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Lanzhou Jiaotong University - Lanzhou 730070, PRC
(a) E-mail: email@example.com (corresponding author)
Received: 15 February 2022
Accepted: 1 December 2022
To investigate the cooperation dynamics caused by coevolution of game strategy and social contacts, we propose a behavioral punishment and reputation based partners-switching mechanism, in which individuals are allowed to sever unwanted partnerships and establish new ones with next-nearest neighbors having high reputations. Simulation results show that cooperation is significantly promoted under the proposed mechanism. Under greater temptation to defect or in denser networks, social partners changing needs to be adequately frequent to support the spread of cooperative behavior. For a given average degree or temptation to defect b, a critical value for time scale ratio W can be observed, above which cooperators occupy the whole population. Our results show that the structural dynamics facilitates the emergence of an underlying heterogeneous network, which provides a favorable network topology for cooperation to prevail under strategy dynamics.
© 2022 EPLA
Current usage metrics show cumulative count of Article Views (full-text article views including HTML views, PDF and ePub downloads, according to the available data) and Abstracts Views on Vision4Press platform.
Data correspond to usage on the plateform after 2015. The current usage metrics is available 48-96 hours after online publication and is updated daily on week days.
Initial download of the metrics may take a while.