| Issue |
EPL
Volume 149, Number 6, March 2025
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Article Number | 63001 | |
| Number of page(s) | 7 | |
| Section | Fluid and nonlinear dynamics | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/adbb15 | |
| Published online | 01 April 2025 | |
Government's policies and public vaccination under major epidemics: An evolutionary game perspective
1 School of Economics and Management, Shandong Agriculture and Engineering University Jinan 250100, China
2 School of Mathematics and Statistics, Beijing Technology and Business University - Beijing 100048, China
3 School of Statistics and Applied Mathematics, Anhui University of Finance and Economics Bengbu 233030, China
Received: 4 July 2024
Accepted: 27 February 2025
Using government vaccine subsidies, public trust and individual physical and mental health losses as the core factors, this study develops a finite rationality-based evolutionary game model aimed at exploring evolutionary stabilisation strategies (ESS) in different contexts. Through simulation analyses, it is found that the strict control strategy adopted by the government can significantly enhance its benefits in the context of voluntary public vaccination against the vaccine. Further, when the government implements a strict prevention and control policy and the benefits of public vaccination are significantly increased under this policy, the system will tend to reach the optimal equilibrium state (vaccination, strict prevention and control).
© 2025 EPLA. All rights, including for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies, are reserved
Current usage metrics show cumulative count of Article Views (full-text article views including HTML views, PDF and ePub downloads, according to the available data) and Abstracts Views on Vision4Press platform.
Data correspond to usage on the plateform after 2015. The current usage metrics is available 48-96 hours after online publication and is updated daily on week days.
Initial download of the metrics may take a while.