Issue |
EPL
Volume 121, Number 1, January 2018
|
|
---|---|---|
Article Number | 18003 | |
Number of page(s) | 7 | |
Section | Interdisciplinary Physics and Related Areas of Science and Technology | |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/121/18003 | |
Published online | 09 March 2018 |
Peer pressure and incentive mechanisms in social networks
1 Key Laboratory of System Control and Information Processing, Ministry of Education of China Shanghai 200240, China
2 Complex Lab, Web Sciences Center and Big Data Research Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China - Chengdu 610054, China
(a) rongzhh@gmail.com
(b) xfwang@sjtu.edu.cn
Received: 25 October 2017
Accepted: 19 February 2018
Cooperation can be viewed as a social norm that is expected in our society. In this work, a framework based on spatial public goods game theory is established to study how peer pressure and incentive mechanisms can influence the evolution of cooperation. A unified model with adjustable parameters is developed to represent the effects of pure Personal Mechanism, Personal Mechanism with peer pressure and Social Mechanism, which demonstrates that when the sum of rewards plus the peer pressure felt by defectors is larger than the effective cost of cooperation, cooperation can prevail. As the peer pressure is caused by other cooperators in a game, group size and network structure play an important role. In particular, larger group size and more heterogeneous structured population can make defectors feel more peer pressure, which will promote the evolution and sustainment of cooperation.
PACS: 87.23.Ge – Dynamics of social systems / 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 89.65.-s – Social and economic systems
© EPLA, 2018
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